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THE LAST DAYS OF ERASTIANISM

-

FORMS IN

THE AMERICAN CHURCH-STATE NEXUS
ROBERT E. RODES, JR.
NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL
NOTRE DAME,

INDIANA 46556

I
INTRODUCTION

IN 1843, the Reverend Robert Baird, "an esteemed minister of
the American Presbyterian Church," sojourning seven years in
Europe "for the prosecutionof certain religious and philanthropic
objects," publisheda book for the benefit of the various Europeans
who had addressed to him "innumerable inquiries . . . respecting

his native country, and especially respecting its religious institutions."

1

The work begins with suitable historical and geographicaldata,
followed by a demonstration that the government of the United
States, and of the several states, though formally nonreligious, is
in fact actuated by Christian principles, and sympathetic to the
work of the churches. From there, the author goes on to develop
what he calls the "Voluntary Principle" that is "the American
plan of supportingreligion by relying, under God's blessing, upon
the efforts of the people, rather than upon the help of the government." 2 He shows the rich variety of ecclesiastical and philanthropic institutions that have grown up under the impetus of this
principle, including not only edifices for religious worship and
missions for spreading the Gospel but also schools and colleges,
institutes for the temporal and spiritual succor of seamen,
prisoners,the poor, and the insane; schools for the training of the
deaf, the dumb, and the blind; and societies for the abolition of
liquor, Sabbath-breaking,slavery, and war. Some of these institutions rely entirely on the piety and philanthropyof those who
wish to support them; others have a sufficienttemporal dimension
1 ROBERT BAIRD,

Religion in the United States of America (Glasgow, Blackie &

Son, 1844), v, vi.
2Id., 69.
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to gain some state support, after being founded out of zeal for
Christian service.
What I find particularly striking about this paean is its resemblance to a modern release by the National Association of Manufacturers extolling the economic benefits of the Free Enterprise
System. Indeed, the Voluntary Principle as Baird conceives it is
precisely the American system of Free Enterprise applied to the
ecclesiastical sphere. Small wonder it has the same kind of
triumphs to report. The triumphs are conceived in utilitarian
terms. Things eminently useful to the community are being accomplished at no cost to the taxpayer, through giving scope to the
zeal and ingenuity of the free citizen. It is in these terms that the
Rev. Mr. Baird conceives the institutional church and its place in
American life.
Half a century later, a still more exuberant statement of similar
effect was written, in the introductory volume of the important
American Church History Series, by H. K. Carroll, who was in
charge of amassing religious data for the 189o census. After dealing with the ecclesiastical state of the country in a variety of statistical and organizational terms, Carroll provides a summary of
"How the Church Affects Society" which is worth considering in
full:
It is to be rememberedthat all the houses of worshiphave been built
by voluntary contributions. They have been provided by private
gifts, but are offered to the public for free use. The government has
not given a dollar to provide them, nor does it appropriatea dollar for
their support. And yet the church is the mightiest, most pervasive,
most persistent, and most beneficent force in our civilization. It
affects, directly or indirectly, all human activities and interests.
It is a large property-holder,and influences the market for real
estate.
It is a corporation,and administerslarge trusts.
It is a public institution, and is therefore the subject of protective
legislation.
It is a capitalist, and gathers and distributes large wealth.
It is an employer, and furnishes means of support to ministers,
organists, singers, janitors, and others.
It is a relief organization feeding the hungry, clothing the naked,
and assisting the destitute.
It is a university, training children and instructing old and young,
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by public lectures on religion, morals, industry, thrift, and the duties
of citizenship.
It is a reformatoryinfluence, recovering the vicious, immoral, and
dangerous elements of society and making them exemplary citizens.
It is a philanthropic association, sending missionaries to the remotest countries to Christianize savage and degraded races.
It is organizedbeneficence, founding hospitals for the sick, asylums
for orphans, refuges for the homeless, and schools, colleges, and universities for the ignorant.
It prepares the way for commerce and creates and stimulates industries. Architects, carpenters, painters, and other artisans are
called to build its houses of worship; mines, quarries, and forests are
worked to provide the materials, and railroadsand ships are employed
in transporting them. It requires tapestries and furnishings, and the
looms that weave them are busy day and night. It buys millions of
Bibles, prayer-books,hymn-books, and papers, and the presses which
supply them never stop.
Who that considers these moral and material aspects of the church
can deny that it is beneficent in its aims, unselfish in its plans, and
impartial in the distribution of its blessings? It is devoted to the
temporal and eternal interests of mankind.
Every cornerstone it lays, it lays for humanity; every temple it
opens, it opens to the world; every altar it establishes, it establishes
for the salvation of souls. Its spires are fingers pointing heavenward;
its ministers are messengers of good tidings, ambassadors of hope,
and angels-of mercy.
What is there among men to compare with the church in its power
to educate, elevate, and civilize mankind?3
This utilitarian tendency of the nineteenth-century American
churchman was not new; it was his heritage. As early as 1306, the
commons of England expressed a similar view of why men set up
churches:
S
. .inform them and the people of the law of God, and to make
to
hospitalities, alms, and other works of charity in the places where the
churches were founded.4
Baird and Carroll, it seems clear, would have agreed.
Christian
3 H. K. CARROLL, The Religious Forces of the United States (New York,
Literature Co., 1893), lx-lxi.
'Rotuli Parliamentorum (1767) I, 319a, quoted in the preamble to 25 Edw. III
c. 6 (1350).
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I have tried in other places to show the historical continuity
between the viewpoint of the fourteenth-centurycommons as expressed in this passage and the Erastianism that occupied a central position in the Anglican Churchfrom the seventeenth through
the nineteenth centuries. I have also tried to show the affinities
between English Erastianism and comparablemovements on this
side of the Atlantic." What all the manifestationsof this Erastian
tradition have in common,and what I have taken for my purposes
as a definitionof Erastianism,is a view of the institutional church
as one of a variety of institutions throughwhich a Christiansociety
conforms itself to the will of God. In practice, this view has often
resulted in a domination of the church by the state, but I think
that is merely a byproductof placing the church on a par with the
other institutions of society. Certainly, Erastianism is not to be
equated with the totalitarian view that religious institutions are to
be subordinatedto secular ends. Quite the opposite, it insists that
religious ends are to be pursued'purposefullyand efficiently, just
as secular ends are.
It is in this venerable Erastian tradition that Baird and Carroll
write, and it is an audiencein the same traditionthey have in mind.
If anyone doubts it, let him consider what Baird and a contemporary non-Erastiansuch as Keble would have had to say to each
other, or how Baird would have answeredthe English pamphleteer
who attributed our Civil War to a divine punishment for our
failure to have an established church.
So we can think of the dominant theme in American churchstate thinking as a kind of free-enterpriseErastianism. Adhering
to the basic Erastian insight that views the institutional church as
one of the many institutional forms through which a Christian
society conforms itself to the will of God, it adds the American
free enterpriseinsight that sees institutional forms as most efficient
when freed from the inhibiting presence of government support.
It appeals to Erastian criteria of efficiency to commend the whole
system versus other systems in which government plays a more
active role.
SSee my The Passing of Nonsectarianism, Notre Dame Lawyer 38 (1963), 115,
121-28.
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This Erastian conception of the American church-state nexus
is by no means confined to the nineteenth century. It is nowhere
more apparent than in the monumental Church and State in the
United States, published by the late Canon Stokes in 1950.6 The
main themes around which Stokes develops the historical and
social panorama of his subject are "adjustments"and "national
issues." Adjustments are the ways in which the several institutional churches, minus the benefits and burdens of state support,
have fallen into their role of embodying the ecclesiastical dimension of the overall national life. National issues are those matters
in which the churches have played institutional roles in dealing
with the concerns of the communityas a whole. The general spirit
of the work is one of thoughtful analysis of the experience of a
nation under God, and of the place of the institutional church in
that experience.
In the long history of Christendom,the Erastian view of which
these American works are the modern representativeshas existed
in tension with what I have called a High Churchview. This view,
representedby the Gregorianreformersin the twelfth century, the
Laudians in the seventeenth, the Oxford movement in the nineteenth, and a variety of less prominent movements in between,
has emphasized a Christian witness to the otherness of God.
Hence, it has seen the institutional churchas standing over against
society in general, rather than as constituting one of the institutions through which society in general conforms itself to the will
of God. The High Church attitude tends to point up the shortcomings of society, and to offer the Christiana way of dissociating
himself from them, rather than of amelioratingthem. In the past,
High Churchmanshiphas sought an institutional witness in forms
that express the independence of the church, and her freedom
from the corruptionsbesetting the rest of society.
On the whole, though, our own country has not developed forms
of this kind. Our prevailing church-state doctrine shows traces
of High Church thinking, as we shall see.' But the generally
6 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, Church and State in the United States, 3 vols. (New
York, Harper, 1950) ; hereafter, STOKES.
' See MARK DEWOLFE
HOWE, The Garden and the Wilderness (Chicago, Uni-

versity of Chicago Press, 1965), 1-31 and passim, in which he contrasts with
Jefferson's doctrine of church-state separation (which he considers anticlerical if
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optimistic tone of American society has kept such thinking from
gaining a solid place in the institutional witness of any of the
main-streamchurches. It is well known that Roman Catholics in
this country have tended to play down the transcendent institutional claims of their church and play up her place among the
useful institutions of democratic society - so much so that the
Roman authorities occasionally took alarm.8 It is also clear that
High Anglicanism in this country, lacking the historical position
of its English counterpart, did not duplicate the institutional
aspirations of the earlier Tractarians." On the whole, a general
denunciationof the world'sways in Americahas been left to fringe
churches, which form enclaves and mind their own business,
rather than bearing witness against the overall society.
The Americanlegal structurehas also played a part in inhibiting
the growth of High Church forms. The utilitarian values characteristic of Erastianism can be implemented by a multiplicity of
churches as readily as by one, by private action as readily as by
the state. This is the cogent truth which Americanexperiencehas
shown with such finality to the other nations of the world. But the
transcendent witness of High Churchmanshipis hard to institutionalize in churchesnone of which can claim a dominantposition
in the overall society, or, indeed, any position at all beyond what
it derives from its constituents. The Voluntary Principle is not a
felicitous expression of the otherness of God.
In a period of increasingself-doubt at many levels of American
not antireligious) Roger Williams' doctrine on the same subject, as set forth in the
following
S passage, id., at 5-6:
The
.
faithful labors of many witnesses of Jesus Christ, extant to the world,
.
abundantly
proving that the church of the Jews under the Old Testament in the
type, and the church of the Christians under the New Testament in the antitype,
were both separate from the world; and that when they have opened a gap in
the hedge or wall of separation between the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world, God hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed the candlestick, and made His garden a wilderness, as at this day. And that therefore if He
will ever please to restore His garden and paradise again, it must of necessity be
walled in peculiarly unto Himself from the world; and that all that shall be
saved out of the world are to be transplanted out of the wilderness of the world,
and added unto his church or garden.
s STOKES, II, 356-69.
" JAMES T. ADDISON, The Episcopal

Church

in the United

States,

1789-1931

(New York, Scribner's, 1951), devotes a whole chapter to "The Oxford Movement
and its American Results" without finding it necessary to say anything at all about
the church-state aspects of the English movement.
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society, a number of the traditional Erastian forms are beginning
to look a bit shopworn,and Christianityitself is beginningto suffer
through the identificationof those forms with an overly optimistic
view of the status quo. It would seem that at such a time as this
the lack of a well-formulated High Church alternative will be
increasingly felt. With this state of affairs in mind, I propose in
this article to explore the current state of our basically Erastian
church-statenexus and to consider what forces, if any, may bring
a relevant and effective institutional High Church witness into
being.
I will begin with a fairly extensive analysis of the legal forms in
which we articulate our understandingof the nature of the institutional church and its place in our national life. Our understanding
of the church itself is developed in a line of cases involving the
judicial resolution of intra-church disputes and the effect to be
given the mandates of ecclesiastical authority. Our understanding of the place of the church in our national life is shown in our
legislative and judicial treatment of tax exemption and state support for church-connectedactivities.
Following this legal analysis, I will take up more briefly the
Erastian forms throughwhich the churchimplementsthe generally
accepted understanding of its role in the national life, and the
incipient High Church forms which may be in the process of
claiming for the church a new and more radical role. In conclusion, I will offer a possible projectioninto the future.
II
LEGAL FORMS

A. Intra-churchDisputes
The status of the institutional church before the secular law
presents a double aspect. On the one hand, the establishmentand
organizing of churches is regarded as a legitimate activity of the
citizens, in which they are entitled to suitable protection from their
government. On the other hand, the mediation of the church
between God and man is regarded as a mystery in which the tri-
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bunals of the state, whether from constitutional limitations or
from the nature of things, are incompetent to intervene. The two
approachesare combined in varying ways in the decisions of the
courts.
The first approach may be regardedas the Erastian-Voluntary
approach. It sees the religious dimension of life as a part of the
pursuit of happiness, and therefore as one of the functional commitments of secular government. It treats the church as one
among the variety of institutions through which happiness is pursued. The second approach has affinities for the High Church
position. It sees the religious dimensionof life as imposing a fundamental limitation on the scope of secular government. It is
capable, therefore, of looking at the church as occupying an area
closed to secular government and to all those institutions secular
governmentcontrols.
These two principles operate with general harmony in supporting the autonomy of Americanchurches,but at certain points they
clash. The problemwhen a question of ecclesiastical polity comes
before the courts is whether to deal with it in terms of some principle of secular law - trust, contract, or corporationlaw - or in
terms of the existential organic forms of the church in question.
If we see the church as merely another of those arrangementsdeveloped by citizens in pursuit of their lawful occasions, we will
naturally apply the principles of law by which other such arrangements are dealt with. For the purpose, we have ready to hand the
substantial body of law developed in England for dealing with
the affairs of dissenters from the Established Church o0(whose
organizationsare secular because only the Established Church is
ecclesiastical)." On the other hand, if we see the several churches,
for all their diversity, as embodying in some way the institutional
transcendenceof Christianity,we are more apt to let their internal
processes work in their own way. For this purpose, if we are unwilling to rest in the higher reaches of theology, we can find an
10Ecclesiastical

ed., XIII

(i955),

Law in HALSBURY, The Laws of England,
I, 527-34.

3d edition,

Simonds

" See the extensive discussion of this point in Selden v. Overseers of the Poor
(Va. Ch. 1830), Cases on Church and State in the United States, Howe ed. (Cam-

bridge, Harvard,

1952),

ii Leigh 127 (Va. 1830).
i6, affirmed
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effective doctrinal base in the corporate mystique of Gierke and
his followers.12
Let us see how these alternative approaches work out in practice. In 1840, suppose, the Brimstone Evangelical Church was
founded, with a Central Synod and a number of local congregations. The founders adopted a Confession of Faith and an Order
of Church Polity. The former document spelled out the doctrinal
tenets of the church; the latter, the organizationof the local congregations and their relation to the Central Synod. The local
congregationin Jordan City was founded in 1853, and operated in
accordance with the Order of Church Polity. The congregation
sent delegates to the Central Synod, hired ministers ordained by
the Synod, and otherwise conducted itself in accordance with the
regulationsof the Synod. Worship was conducted on land deeded
by a church memberin 1856 "in trust for the Brimstone Evangelical Churchin Jordan City."
A couple of years ago, the Central Synod adopted a new Confession of Faith, which mitigated considerably the uncompromising position on predestination taken by the earlier document.
The new Confession was bitterly fought in the Synod, and more
bitterly still in the local congregations, but the more traditionminded were in most cases outvoted. In the Jordan City congregation, a motion to reject the new confession and sever connections
with the Synod was voted down 86-34.
At this point, the minority of the congregation appeals to
Caesar. They are aware, of course, that the majority may adopt
what doctrine they please; what they are interested in is getting
the building and the bank account for their party. They claim they
are entitled to these because they represent the doctrines for
which the property was given. It is on this - a litigation more or
less over the possession of property- that the secular courts must
rule.
They have two stock legal categories to work with. The foundation documents of the church are a kind of contract, and the
original deed of the land is a kind of trust. So we can look at the
documents and see if they give the Synod power to change the
12

This approach to ecclesiastical disputes is developed in J. N. FIGGIS,Churches

in the Modern State

(New

York, 1914).
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Confession, or we can look at the intentions of the grantorand see
if a change in the Confession was envisaged when he deeded the
land. Either of these approaches will probably come up with a
negative answer and results in giving the property to those who
oppose the new Confession.
Complicate the matter a little more. Suppose that in I894 the
Jordan City congregationtook out articles of incorporationunder
one of the numerous state statutes for the incorporation of
churches,providingitself with a Board of Trustees, and whatever
other apparatusthe statute requires. Then the courts, in addition
to the appropriatequestions of trust or contract, can worry about
whether the vote was taken in accordancewith statutory forms
whether the meeting was properly called, the voting rolls properly
kept, and what have you.
On the other hand, if we look at the church as a living organization, we will be reluctant to use juridical concepts so foreign to
its nature to frustrate its response,to the promptingsof the Spirit
or the currents of the times. We may well conclude that when its
institutional processes have moved as far as they are capable of
moving, it is not the place of the secular authorities to stand in the
way.13 To be sure, a man could set up a trust or enter into a contract to propagate a particular doctrine of predestination,but on
this view of the situation we will not go out of our way to suppose
that he has in fact done so.
Of the two approachesdescribedhere, the more forward-looking
theologians have naturally favored the second, pointing out that
the first, or trust-and-contract,approach tends to inhibit religious
development, especially in the area of ecumenism.'" It tends to
produce a separate institutional form to correspond to every
nuance of doctrine. The courts, on the other hand, when forced to
concernthemselveswith ecclesiasticalmatters, have found comfort
in clinging to the familiarcategories of secular law.
A variety of compromiseshave been attempted. Some courts,
for instance, especially those of New York, endeavor to draw a
"3See the exuberant statement of this principle in McGinnis v. Watson, 41 Pa.
St. 9 (i86i).
"
STRINGFELLOW, Law, Polity and the Reunion of the Church, Ohio State Law
Journal 20 (1959),
CASAD, The Establishment
412;
Movement, Michigan Law Review 62 (1964), 419.

Clause

and the Ecumenical
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distinction between a "spiritual" entity, the "church," and a
"temporal"entity, the "society,"which exist in a kind of hypostatic
union, the one governed by denominationalcustom, the other by
state law.'" This distinction is more persuasive when applied to
those Protestant bodies which restrict their communionto persons
who have undergone a special experience of conversion, or who
otherwise possess qualities the whole congregationdoes not have.16
It seems ultimately to relate to ecclesiological conceptions that
radically distinguish the Mystical Body from the visible church.
Those who reject the ecclesiology in question 17 may find the
judicial doctrine less than congenial. And even those who accept
the ecclesiology may object to the scope the judicial doctrine gives
for interfering in the temporal affairs of a church on behalf of
members of the congregation who are not full-fledged communicants.
The United States SupremeCourt, almost a century ago, in the
famous Watson v. Jones decision,1"attempted to give some recognition to the existential organization of the church without going
too far afield from familiar legal categories. Cases involving ecclesiastical property, the Court said, fell into three categories:
i. Where the property is subject to an express trust, that trust
will be enforced as written.
Where the property is held by an independentcongregation,
the court will apply the usual principles of law governing
voluntary associations to determinewhich of the contending
parties constitutes the congregationin question.

2.

3. Where the property is held by a congregation belonging to
a "hierarchical"church with superior judicial or administrative bodies, the determination of those bodies will be
given effect.
"

Hayes v. Trustees of Holy Trinity Baptist Church, 225 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Sup.

1962).
"0Robertson v. Bullions, ii N.Y. 243 (1854), a leading case on the distinction
between church and corporation, attaches considerable weight to the exclusiveness
of full communion.
'7 It is
expressly rejected, for instance, in the encyclical Mystici Corporis of Pius
XII.
18

13 Wall. 679 (U.S. 1871).
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As the case involved a churchin the third category, remarksabout
the treatment of the other two categories may be regardedas dictum. Even as to the third category, the Court's decision was only
federal common-law- the state courts were not obliged to follow it."9 But as a fairly sophisticatedapproachto the diversity of
churchforms in our society, it generally commendeditself. In any
event, the Kedroff decision in 1952 2" erected it into a constitutional doctrine.
Between Kedroff and the Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on the subject in the Hull Memorial case (January, 1969),21
the state courts developed a couple of modifications of the Supreme Court doctrine. The most importantof these was the Fundamental Change Rule, whereby dissenters were protected against
any change in doctrine which the courts were willing to characterize as "fundamental"even though the appropriate ecclesiastical
machineryhad adopted it. The theory was that the property was
subject to an "implied trust" that it would not be fundamentally
diverted from the religious affiliation the donors had in mind.22
This rule was applied more to congregationalthan to hierarchical
churches, presumably because of the greater stability and expertise to be expected from the higher authorities of a hierarchical church."2But even these higher authorities were occasionally
overruledon fundamentalchanges.2"
The other modification was more subtle. Watson v. Jones
expressly disclaimedany right of the secular courts in dealing with
the affairsof a hierarchicalchurchto determinewhether the higher
"1Watson v. Garvin, 54 Mo. 353 (1873), a product of the same Presbyterian
schism over slavery that evoked Watson v. Jones, takes the latter case vigorously
to task as an abrogation of the proper responsibility of civil courts:
The civil courts are presumed to know the law touching property rights; and if
questions of ecclesiastical law, connected with property rights, come before them,
they are compelled to decide them. They have no power to abdicate their own
jurisdiction and transfer it to other tribunals. If they are not sufficiently advised concerning the questions that arise, it is their duty to make themselves
better acquainted with them, in all their bearings, and not to blindly register the
decrees of tribunals having no jurisdiction whatever over property.
?Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
21 Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 89 Sup. Ct. 6oi (U.S. 1969).
22 See,
e.g., Stansberry v. McCarty, 238 Ind. 338, 149 N.E.2d 683 (1958); Holiman v. Dovers, 236 Ark. 211, 366 S.W.2d 197, 15 A.L.R.3d 277 (1963).
' See
CASAD,supra, note 14 at 445f.
See, e.g., Mills v. Yount, 393 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. App. 1965).
.2
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authorities acted within the jurisdiction allowed them under the
laws and customs of the church. The theory was that a church
tribunal, learned in the laws under which it sits, is better equipped
to determine its jurisdiction than a secular court would be.
The state courts - perhaps because they had a wider variety
of churches to worry about - tended to be a little more sophisticated on this point. A number of them recognized that a church
might straddle two of the categories in Watson v. Jones - be
congregationalin some respects, hierarchicalin others- or that
the founders of a church organization might have seen fit to
impose constitutional restraints on ecclesiastical authority as
such.25
So, if our hypothetical case had been decided last year, the
court would have been very apt to consider whether the modification of the confession of Faith on predestinationwas fundamental,
and, if not, whether the Central Synod acted within its authority
in making it. This year it is a different story. In Presbyterian
Church in the United States v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church,26the Supreme Court held that the Fundamental Change
Rule (which they characterized as the "departure-from-doctrine
approach") "canplay no role in any future judicial proceedings"27
(Mr. Justice Brennan'sitalics).
If civil courts undertaketo resolve such controversiesin order to
adjudicatethe propertydispute,the hazardsare ever presentof in'
See, e.g., Western Conference v. Creech, 256 N.C. 128, 123 S.E.2d 619 (1962);
CASAD,supra, note 14 at 44on. Among the complications not envisaged in the
Watson v. Jones categories is that presented by a case with which I have some
acquaintance in which the issue was which of three hierarchies was the one to which
a certain local congregation had adhered. Another complication was suggested by
an unsuccessful petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in the
famous Mellish case. See LEOPFEFFER,Church, State and Freedom (Boston, Beacon, 1953), 251-57 (hereafter, PFEFFER). The case involved a state court intervening
in a dispute in an Episcopal parish by (quite properly under Watson v. Jones
standards) granting an injunction in favor of the faction approved by the bishop.
The point raised on the petition for certiorari was that the canon law of the
Episcopal Church had a specific sanction for a parish violating the bishop's order
--deprivation of representation in the diocesan convention. Accordingly, the application of Watson v. Jones gave the bishop more power than the canons of the
church gave him--more power, it might be added, than any Anglican bishop has
had in all history before.
2889 Sup. Ct. 6o0 (U.S. 1969).
S
Id. at 607.
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hibitingthe free developmentof religiousdoctrineand of implicating
secularinterestsin mattersof purelyecclesiasticalconcern.2s
Hull Memorial does not put quite the same italicized quietus on
the concern of the state courts with whether ecclesiastical tribunals act within their jurisdictionallimits. It cited with apparentapproval an old case in which the court rejected the determinationof
the majority of the general conference of the United Brethren
Churchas to whether a purportedconstitutional amendment had
been properly voted in by the membership.29 So, though the
SupremeCourt is very stern in admonishingthat
States, religiousorganizationsand individualsmust structurerelationshipsinvolvingchurchpropertyso as not to requirethe civil
courtsto resolveecclesiasticalquestions. . .30
we cannot be sure quite how they would deal with a case like
Western Conference v. Creech,3'in which the issue was whether
a local congregation of Original Free Will Baptists had power
under the polity of that church to withdraw from the Conference
to which it belonged.
Be that as it may, it seems pretty clear at this point that these
cases must be looked at in constitutionalterms- that is, as fundamentally involving religious freedom rather than tenure of
property. In applying the concept of religious freedom, there is
still a double aspect. To say that a church has a constitutional
right to govern itself is to give constitutionalstature to entities unknown to the constitution, and perhaps establish a religion into
the bargain. But to say simply that a citizen has a constitutional
right to organize a self-governingchurch is to belie the posture of
the typical litigation (in which the church itself in its corporate
capacity is one of the parties), and in general to give a false picture
of what we are doing.
It is not easy, for instance, to see what natural person had his
religious freedom enhanced by the Kedroff decision,32 in which
281d. at 6o6.
29Brundage v. Deardoff, 55 Fed. 839 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893), cited 89 Sup. Ct. 605.
30 89 Sup. Ct. at 606.
31Supra, note 25.
32Supra, note 20.
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the Supreme Court held that constitutional religious freedom required the states to follow Watson v. Jones. Let us look at the
case. In issue was the possession of the Russian Orthodox
cathedral in New York City. On one side was Kedroff,backed by
a quarter century and more of litigation, and by the venerable
authority of the Moscow Patriarch. On the other side was almost
the entire communityof Russian Orthodoxadherentsin the United
States, who had formed an independentchurch governmentin the
'twenties, on the theory that the Patriarch was too far under the
control of the Soviet governmentto be an effective shepherdof an
American (and White Russian) flock. Both the courts and the
legislature of New York, sharing the concern with Soviet domination of the Moscow Patriarch, had done all they could to turn
Kedroff out of the cathedral and put the American churchmenin.
To no avail. A majority of the Supreme Court, following Watson v. Jones, decided in favor of Kedroff. The Russian Orthodox
Church, they said, was a hierarchical church, and the Moscow
Patriarch was its top hierarch. For New York to subvert the
Patriarch's authority was a violation of the religious freedom
guaranteedby the federal constitution. While the opinions on the
prevailing side pay some attention to property concepts, their
general thrust is in the direction of freedom for the church and
forbearanceby the state:
There are occasionswhen civil courtsmust drawlines betweenthe
responsibilitiesof church and state for the dispositionor use of
property.Even in those caseswhenthe propertyright followsas an
incidentfromdecisionsof the churchcustomor law on ecclesiastical
issues, the churchrule controls. This underour Constitutionnecessarily followsin orderthat theremay be free exerciseof religion.Mr.JusticeReedfor the majority.33
St. Nicholas Cathedral is not just a piece of real estate. . . . A
cathedral is the seat and center of ecclesiastical authority. . . . What

is at stake here is the powerto exercisereligiousauthority. That is
- Mr. Justice Frankfurterconthe essence of this controversy.
curring.34
Mr. Justice Jackson, insisting that the devolution of New York
'33344U.S. at 120--21.
34Id. at 121.
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real estate should be governed by New York law, underscoredthe
presuppositionsof the majority by dissenting from them:
I do not see how one can spell out of the principlesof separationof
churchand state a doctrinethat a state submitpropertyrights to
settlementby canonlaw.35
In fine, the decision seems to be recognized by all concerned as
holding that constitutional religious freedom requires the unimpeded exercise of ecclesiastical authority.
Well, then, let us return to the question: what natural person
has his religious freedom enhanced by the principle in question?
The only answer anyone has proposedis a natural person who has
opted for a hierarchicalchurch and contributed of his fortune to
supply its material needs. But St. Nicholas Cathedral was built
in 1903, when the chief rule in the Russian OrthodoxChurchwas
borne by the Czar. The Patriarchalthrone had been vacant since
the time of Peter the Great and its functions exercisedby a Synod,
headed up by the Czar's Procurator. The New York law under
which the cathedral congregation was incorporatedleft the final
say in disputed matters to the Czar's consul in New York City.
If those who contributed their money to the Building Fund in
those far-off days had been asked what they would want done in
the event the Czar were to be overthrownby an atheist government, and the Patriarchate to be established in subservience to
that government,what would they have said? The best answer is
probably provided by what they in fact did twenty years after the
cathedral was built - just what their Russian ancestors did,
incidentally, when Constantinoplefell to the Turks.3"
The question is not whether Kedroff was rightly decided in
view of this state of affairs, but what kind of freedom it may be
said to have recognized. My point is that to speak of the freedom
of a group of citizens to practice their religion requires a somewhat contorted analysis of the case, whereas to speak of the freeMId. at 126, 131.
a See the same case below, 302 N.Y. I (1950): "The Russian Church originally
was subject to the Patriarch of Constantinople but acquired greater autonomy when
Constantinople fell to the Turks and the Metropolitan of Moscow was no longer
appointed by the Patriarch of Constantinople but was elected by the Russian
bishops."

This content downloaded from 129.74.250.206 on Fri, 1 Nov 2013 08:49:40 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

LAST DAYS OF ERASTIANISM

317

dom of the Russian Orthodox Church to govern itself according
to its canons does not.
This freedom of ecclesiastical processes to move in an area
where secular processes cannot follow seems to be a High Church
freedom. It is less reminiscentof traditional Bill of Rights learning than of the medieval conception of libertas ecclesiae. Gregory
VII (1073-85)

based the High Church movement that bears his

name on an understandingof libertas as a state of affairs in which
each of the several parts of a divinely ordered universe moved
without hindrance in its appointed sphere."3It was on this basis
that he (and his successors for many a generation) conceived of
the church as standing over against secular society, suitably restricting the things that are Caesar's, and claiming as its own the
things that are God's.
Needless to say, this High Church conception was not fully
viable in Gregory'stime, as it is not fully viable today. The medieval bishop was sometimes treated as an ambassadorof God, but
he was sometimes treated also as a magnate competing with other
magnates for the available resourcesof society. He was sometimes
a judge in his own tribunals, sometimes a litigant in the king's. So
in our time, the various manifestations of the institutional church
are sometimes groups of citizens on their lawful occasions, making
only those claims on the state that any citizens do who are pursuing happiness in their own way - and sometimes a presence in
human affairs which cannot be ignored, but which transcends the
regulatorypowers of the state.
B. Tax Exemption
Churches have been wholly or partially exempt from secular
taxes since the time of Constantineat least; only the most rigorous
ideologues feel that such exemption violates state or federal constitutional provisions. The most recent judicial word on the subject is that of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Murray v.
3 GERDTELLENBACH, Church, State, and Christian Society, Bennet ed. & tr.
(Oxford, O.U.P., 1959). Instructive on this point is Frankfurter's language, 344
U.S. at 123-24, analogizing the action of the New York authorities to the German
Kulturkampf of the 1870's, and to other disputes "not unfairly attributable to a
claim by the State of comprehensive loyalty, undeflected by the competing claims
of religious faith."
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Comptrollerof the Treasury (1966).3S Madalyn Murray, Baltimore's indefatigable nemesis of the spiritual estate, fresh from a
notable triumph over Bible reading in the schools,39brought the
action as a taxpayer: her share of the burdens of governmentwas
the more in that the churches' was the less. She was the victim
either of an arbitrary classification or of an establishment of
religion.
Not so, said the Court. The state may bestow its tax exemptions wherever it has a legitimate public purpose in doing so.
While the promotion of religion, as such, cannot be a legitimate
public purposebecause of the nonestablishmentclause,40 a variety
of secular purposes are served by religious organizations. These
the state can legitimately promote or permit the citizens to
promotewithout paying taxes. If such purposesare so intertwined
with religious activities that the latter cannot conveniently be
separately taxed, the state may exempt the organization entirely.
Note the Erastian tenor of the argument so far.
But there is anotherline of argument. Several amici curiae have
urged, the Court points out, that not to grant tax exemption to a
church violates the free exercise clause of the constitution. This
argument has some support in Justice Douglas' 1943 opinion in
Murdock v. Pennsylvania4~ (a difficultcase, which I shall take up

at length below). The Court in Mrs. Murray's case was not willing to pass on this argumentone way or the other, beyond saying
that it was plausible enough to be taken into account by the
legislature in deciding to grant the exemption. Here, of course,
is a solidly High Church contention, with roots in the anathemas
of Boniface VIII:
That laymenhavebeenvery hostileto clerksantiquityrelates,which
too the experiencesof moderntimes manifestlydeclare,whilst not
contentwith theirownboundsthey strivefor the forbiddenand loose
the reins for thingsunlawful. Nor do they prudentlyconsiderhow
poweroverclerksor ecclesiasticalpersonsor goodsis forbiddenthem:
38 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897 (1966).
3 Mrs. Murray's case was a companion case to School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
4oEarlier cases would probably not make this concession. See the quote at
STOKES,III, 419.
413i9 U.S. 105 (I943).
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they impose heavy burdenson the prelates of the churchesand
ecclesiasticalpersonsregularand secular,and tax them,and impose
collections. .

.

. - Clericis Laicos 42 (1296).

"Very hostile to clerks" seems a legitimate characterization of
Mrs. Murray.
So the upshot of the Murray case is that it is no establishmentof
religion to exempt churches from taxation, because they serve a
variety of secular purposes; and it just might be an interference
with free exercise to tax them, because they are religious. The
United States SupremeCourt denied certiorari.43
The Erastian interpretation of the tax exemption is borne out
by a series of cases involving the exemption of atheistic organizations. Where such organizations gather for moral exhortation,
hymn-singing, and the like, they are typically exempted from
taxation on the ground that their activities, as one court put it,
are analogousto the activities,serve the same place in the lives of
[their] members,and occupy the same place in society, as the activitiesof the theisticchurches.44
The general idea seems again to be that we are dealing with a way
of pursuing happiness, that the more innocuous and high-minded
of the pursuits of the citizenry ought to have this public encouragement because an innocuous and high-minded people is what we
aspire to be. Another court referred to the "context of exemption
to art galleries libraries, public charities hospitals schools and
colleges," and inferred a "broad legislative purpose to grant support to elements in the community regardedas good for the community." 45
These cases generally suppose that the exemption accorded the
atheist organization is a matter of constitutional right - that if
the theistic religion were given a status denied the atheist, there
would be a forbiddenestablishmentof religion. This again relates
42 Corpus Juris Canonici, Canon 3, Book III, title 23 in Sext. Translation from
Documents Illustrative of English Church History, Gee and Hardy eds. (London,
Macmillan, 1896), 87.
43385 U.S. 816 (1968).
"4Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App.2d 673, 315 P.2d
394, 4o9-1o (1957).
45Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir.
1957).

This content downloaded from 129.74.250.206 on Fri, 1 Nov 2013 08:49:40 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

HARVARDTHEOLOGICAL
REVIEW

320

to the fundamental Erastian insight that the church is one of a
variety of institutions through which society pursues its goals.
This makes the nonestablishmentclause an Erastian principle. A
benefit conferred on the church is free of the charge of establishment as long as the church is only one among the institutions on
which the benefit is conferred.
But the notion, relied on to an indeterminateextent in Murray,
that secular activities of churches form the basis of the exemption
must be taken with a grain of salt. Instructive in this regard is
the provision in the Internal Revenue Code for taxing "unrelated
business income" of tax-exempt organizations.4"This provision,
enacted in i951 to plug a substantial loophole in the existing law,
imposes a tax on income made by a tax-exempt organizationin a
business that does not relate to the tax-exempt purpose except
as a source of funds. But there is exempted from this tax the
unrelatedbusiness income made by "a church, a convention or association of churches. ..

."
'YThe

committee reports," a sub-

stantial article on the subject remarks, "are barren of any statement of the reason for this." "
The Internal Revenue Service has defined a church, for purposes of this exemption, to be a body that performs ministerial or
sacerdotal services, or conducts religious worship. The Christian
Brothers, proud heirs of a long tradition of ecclesiastical winemaking, but alas, no priests, tried to get around this definition,
but could not.4" As matters now stand, the Jesuits, by reason of
their priesthood,enjoy the exemption,whereas the good Brothers,
lacking the sacred unction, do not.
It seems unlikely (as well as unconstitutional) that Congress
felt that religious worship was more deserving of encouragement
than education or the relief of the poor. Rather, it seems they felt
more diffidentabout taxing religious worship than they did about
taxing equally worthy but more clearly secular works. In short,
we may see in the contours of this exemptiononce again the mark
of a High Churchview.
United States Internal Revenue Code (1954), ?511.
and DOHAN, Sales, Churches,and Monkeyshines, Tax Law Review ii
(1955), 87, Io3.
4 De La Salle Institute v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal., 1961).
4

4,

MOORE
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But is this touch-not-my-anointedview of tax exemption built
into the free exercise clause of the federal Constitution? The
answer to this question must be found, if at all, in an analysis of
the 1943 case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.49 The case involved
a city ordinance imposing a license tax on itinerant peddlersfrom $I.50 to

$20.00,

depending on how long they stayed in town.

Murdock was a Jehovah's Witness, who sold (or sometimes gave)
Bibles, Watchtowers, and the like to those he visited in his doorto-door evangelism. The city fathers thought this made him an
itinerant peddler of Bibles and Watchtowers, subject to the same
license tax as an itinerant peddler of anything else.
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a bare majority of the Court
(himself, Stone, C.J., Black, Murphy, and Rutledge, JJ.) held that
the tax could not be applied to Murdock. Door-to-door distribution of the printedword, he said, was a traditionalmeans of spreading a religion- as much so as preachingor holding revival meetings. To make the right to engage in such activities depend on
getting a license and paying a tax is to interfere with the free
exercise of religion. The fact that Murdock made a financial return from selling these books and pamphlets did not matter.
"Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedomof religion are
available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way." 50
Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Roberts, JJ., dissented in a
number of opinions. They felt that an itinerant evangelist should
bear his fair share of the burdens of government like any other
man, and that if a tax was not set so high as to be a prohibition
and did not single out a constitutionally protected activity for a
special burden, it could not be said to violate constitutional freedoms.
There seem to me to be three main lines of argument for saying
that Murdock did not write Clericis Laicos into the free exercise
clause. None of them is altogether convincing:
i. The prevailing opinion says:
We do not meanto say that religiousgroupsand the press are free
from all financial burdens of government. .

.

. We have here some-

thing quite different,for example,froma tax on the incomeof one
U.S. 105 (1943).
'Id. at III.

49 39
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who engagesin religiousactivitiesor a tax on propertyused or employedin connectionwith these activities. It is one thing to tax the
incomeor propertyof a preacher.It is quite anotherthing to exact
a tax fromhim for the privilegeof deliveringa sermon.51
The exact nature of the distinction suggested here is a little difficult to see, and it becomes a good deal more so after it is subjected
to the remorseless logic of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
opinion.52
2. The language about "conditioning"the religious activity on
the payment of a tax is somewhat reminiscent of the doctrine in
the free speech cases that "prior restraints" are more objectionable than consequencesvisited after the event. Arguably,then, the
state under Murdock can tax a man for having sold Watchtowers
(by imposing a sales tax, for instance), but cannot make him pay
before he sells. This argumenthas against it the fact that the prior
restraint approachhas not stood up very well in free-speech cases
- most speech, if it is protected at all, is now protected after the
event as well as before. At any rate, the "condition" test could
be applied to most kinds of taxation. For instance, if a church
building could be sold off in a tax sale, it is hard to see that paying
the tax would not be a condition imposed on continuingto worship
there.
3. The prevailing opinion in Murdock was very careful to put
freedom of religion on the same footing with freedom of the press
- as, indeed, most of the religion cases in the '40's were.53 But if
the constitutional tax immunity of a church is no greater than
that of a newspaper,it is not very great. In fact, though, the fol-

low-up case of Follett v. McCormick "4 (i944)
5

Id. at

seems to drop the

112.

"Nor, as I have indicated, can a tax be invalidated because the exercise of a constitutional privilege is conditioned upon its payment. It depends upon the nature of the condition that is imposed, its justification,
and the extent to which it hinders or restricts the exercise of the privilege."
52Id. at 134, especially 136-37:

"sHOWE, supra, note 7, at 9I1-I8.
The facts differed from those in Murdock only in that
"4321 U.S. 573 (I944).

here the Jehovah's Witness involved was not an itinerant, but worked full time in
the community that endeavored to tax him. A dissenting opinion by Roberts, Jackson, and Frankfurter, JJ., 319 U.S. at 579, 581-82, suggested that the entire publication industry would have to be afforded the immunity established in the prevailing opinion. The majority did not address this point.
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talk about the press. Since Sherbert v. Verner55 (1963) it would
be hard to go on saying the two freedomswere the same.
Putting all these argumentstogether it seems to me we will have
to say that the church has a constitutional right to some but not
all of the tax immunity it now enjoys. I should think that a tax on
investment property or investment income, a nondiscriminatory
sales tax on Bibles, Watchtowers,crucifixesor rosary beads would
be constitutional, whereas a tax on real estate used for religious
worship or sepulture, a personal property tax on reliquaries or
chalices, or an income tax on the contents of the collection plate
would interfere with the free exercise of religion.5"
Further, it seems that such constitutional right to exemption as
the church has is not shared with other constitutionally protected
activities, but belongs to the church precisely because it is the
church- because it deals with a dimension of human existence
that the Founding Fathers intended to shield from government
intervention. However hard we try, we cannot think of a personal
property tax on a typewriter as all of a piece with one on a set of
Communionplate.
In the end, it seems to me, the law treats tax exemptionin about
the same way it treats intra-churchdisputes. Its main thrust in
both cases is Erastian. It recognizes the church as one of the
institutions through which citizens engage in their harmless or
commendablepursuits. It recognizes the support and encouragement of such institutions as high on the list of proper functions
of government. But in both cases there is a core of High Church
doctrine in the authorities, doctrine which sees the ambit of the
The case holds that persons with religious scruples
55374 U.S. 398 (1963).
against obeying a law may have a constitutional right to exemption where others
would have no such right. Thus, it is a drastic departure from the doctrine of the
'40's, as represented by West Virginia Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), where the court established the right of a Jehovah's Witness not to salute
the flag by holding that everyone has a right not to salute the flag. The religious
right in Barnette was assimilated to free speech by saying that free speech included
freedom not to speak, and therefore freedom not to salute the flag. But if freedom
of religion is conceived in terms of Sherbert, no comparable free speech analogues
can be developed.
~ The conclusions set forth in PFEFFER, 603, seem to accord fairly well with
mine. It is interesting also that President Grant, an early proponent of doing away
with general tax exemption for churches, was prepared to exempt "the last restingplace of the dead, and possibly, with proper restrictions, church edifices." Quoted
Id. at i88.
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church as standing both constitutionally and philosophically outside the scope of the princes of this world.
C. Financial Support
The expanded financial involvement of government in all aspects of public life has meant that a good many ecclesiastical
projects of the kind alluded to by Mr. Baird are now receiving a
measure of support from state or federal funds. Since taxes come
out of the same pockets as private benefactions, it is more or less
inevitable that this should be the case - the more money government spends, the less private agencies can raise and the more tax
money they must have if they are to survive.
Government response to this need is by now substantial in
amount, although somewhat haphazard in form. The federal
government, and most of the states, subsidize denominational
hospitals on the same terms as any others."' The Anti-Poverty
Program involves church-relatedagencies in all kinds of ways,
subject to a fairly elaborate set of provisions that prevent federal
funds from being used for proselytism or religious worship."5The
Education title of the United States Code Annotated contains a
rich variety of provisions whereby denominational institutions
can be supported in one or another of their numerous concerns.
Here, the big money is for colleges, but there are a number of
special projects (e.g., the furnishing of teachers for the children
of migrant agricultural workers) in which church-related elementary schools can share.59A numberof states provide lunches,
health services, audio-visualaids, textbooks, or bus transportation
for such schools.60
Needless to say, the justification offered for all this support is
Erastian. Functions in which the public is interested are supThe federal law on the point
57PFEFFER, I73-79.
Code, title 42, ?? 291, 291d.

is found

in United

States

'Office of Economic Opportunity Community Action Program Guide (1965),

99-100oo.
5 United States Code, title 20,

?? 445, 611, 671, 751, 952(e), II07a, 1205(a) (5)
are examples of provisions making private schools eligible for the various programs
to which they apply.
'

ANSON PHELPS STOKES and LEO PFEFFER,

Church and State

States, revised ed. (New York, Harper & Row, 1964).
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ported equally whether or not they are carried out under religious
auspices. Citizens who do certain things in a religious way are
given the same support they would be given if they did the same
things in a secular way. The two Supreme Court cases of Bradfield v. Roberts 61 (1899) and Cochran v. Louisiana State Board
of Education

62 (1930)

state the arguments clearly and succinctly.

Bradfield involved a substantial appropriationby Congress to
enable a Catholic hospital in Washington to expand its facilities
for the benefit of indigent patients sent by the District of Columbia Commissioners. The hospital was run by a membershipcorporation chartered for the purpose under secular law. It just so
happened that the membersof the corporationwere all nuns. The
Court felt that this fact made no difference:
That the influenceof any particularchurchmay be powerfulover the
membersof a non-sectarian
and secularcorporation,
for
incorporated
a certaindefinedpurposeandwith clearlystatedpowers,is surelynot
sufficientto convertsuch a corporationinto a religiousor sectarian
body.63
As they were a secular corporationperforminga public purpose,
there was no obstacle to providing them with public funds.
Cochran involved a state providing free textbooks for schoolchildren, regardless of the kind of schools they attended. It was
contended that the statute, insofar as it conferred benefits on
parochial students, was unconstitutional. The Court held, however, that as everyone got the same books, and none of the books
in question was religious, there could be no question of supporting religious education, or of diverting public funds to a private
purpose.
To this day, those who support the spending of public funds for
this or that ecclesiastical project make their case with arguments
like those just set forth." Indeed, some carry the argument one
step farther and insist that to exclude an activity from government support simply because it is carried out under religious
61175 U.S. 291 (I899).
* 281 U.S.
370 (1930).
S175 U.S. at 298.

"Including the Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
which came down while I was preparing this article.

(1968),
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auspices is to practice an improper, if not unconstitutional, form of
discrimination:
In the event that a Federal Aid Program is enacted which excludes
children in private schools these children will be the victims of discriminatory legislation. There will be no alternative but to oppose
such discrimination.65
In fact, it is this very discrimination which the opponents of
public support not only favor but insist is constitutionally required. For them, the fact that an otherwise innocuous activity
is carried on under religious auspices creates an overriding objection to public support for it, an objection that rests on the hallowed traditions of our fathers. The best statement of the view in
question is that of Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in the Everson
school bus case (1947)."* A bare majority of the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Black, had held that New Jersey might include parochial students in a general program of tax-supported
transportation to and from school. The majority found a public
purpose served in a nondiscriminatory way. Rutledge met the
argument head-on:
Strippedof its religiousphase, the case presents no substantial federal
question. . . . The public function argument, by casting the issue in
terms of promoting the general cause of education and the welfare of
the individual, ignores the religious factor and its essential connection
with the transportation,thereby leaving out the only vital element in
the case. .... To say that New Jersey's appropriationand her use
of the power of taxation for raising the funds appropriatedare not for
public purposesbut are for private ends, is to say that they are for the
support of religion and religious teaching. Conversely, to say that
they are for public purposes is to say that they are not for religious
ones.67

Behind this reasoning Rutledge places Madison's Virginia Remonstrance (1785), which he reads into the First Amendment through
Madison's part in the enactment of the latter. He finds in the
"

Quoted in

66330

U.S. I,

STOKES

and

PFEFFER,

op. cit. supra, note 60, at

442.

28.

67Id. at 50-51.
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public purpose argument of the majority the same view that was
put forward in the proposed legislation against which the Remonstrance was addressed:
Whereas the general diffusion of Christian knowledge hath a natural
tendency to correct the morals of men, restrain their vices, and preserve the peace of society. .
..s

Such a view implies for Madison, as the majority view here does
for Rutledge,
that the Civil Magistrate . . . may employ Religion as an engine of
Civil policy.69
This view Madison considers "an unhallowed perversion of the
means of salvation."
Our constitutional policy, [Rutledge insists] is exactly the opposite.
It does not deny the value or necessity for religious training, teaching,
or observance. But to that end it does deny that the state can sustain
them in any form or degree. For this reason the sphere of religious
activity, as distinguished from the secular intellectual liberties, has
been given the twofold protection [i.e., free exercise and no establishment] and, as the state cannot forbid, neither can it performor aid in
performing the religious function. The dual prohibition makes that
function altogether private. ... It is not because religious teaching
does not promote the public or the individual's welfare, but because
neither is furtheredwhen the state promotes religious education, that
the Constitution forbids it to do so.70
To sum up his argument on this point, Rutledge says:
The realm of religious training and belief remains, as the Amendment
made it, the kingdom of the individual and his God. It should be
kept inviolably private. . . .'

Rutledge's strictures can be taken in either of two ways. On the
one hand, we may consider them a simple affirmation of Baird's
Voluntary Principle as the essential American version of the
Erastian tradition. The language about religion being a public
68Id. at 5In.

69Id. at 41n.
7oId. at 52.
711d. at 57-58.
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purpose but one the governmentcannot promote seems to call for
this interpretation. On the other hand, the language about "the
kingdom of the individual and his God," taken together with the
quoting of Madison's remarks about "an unhallowed perversion
of the means of salvation," seems to go deeper, to envisage a realm
in which not merely the government but the secular commonwealth as such can have no place. This, of course, in its implications, is High Church.
The first, or Erastian-Voluntary,interpretationis becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in a period when so many secular
aspects of the free enterprise system are receiving government
support. It seems that if our basic social functions are to go on
being performed at the grass-roots level by a system of local and
voluntary institutions, the system will have to be supported at
crucial points by a judicious input of government funds. And if
free churchinstitutions are to grow and keep pace with the rest of
the system, they will have to be subsidized when the occasion
arises, along with the rest. T6 cut them off from the money in this
day and age is to distinguishthem radically from the other institutions of society, and thus deny the Erastian presupposition on
which the Voluntary Principle was based.
So, however Rutledge may have conceived himself, I think we
will have to conceive him in High Church terms. If ecclesiastical
projects are to be cut off from governmentfunds, it is because they
occupy a place in the lives of men where the concerns of secular
governmentcannot follow them.
We do not seem preparedon the whole to take any of the above
arguments to its logical conclusion in our national life. On the
one side, there is a group called Citizens for EducationalFreedom,
which insists that private schools do the same job as public schools
and should have the same support. But in practice, their political
projects have been limited to the customary auxiliary services
plus token subsidies in cash, and even with these they have had no
great success. On the other side, a few civil libertarians,and even
a churchman or two, have questioned the constitutionality of
federal funds for church-relatedhospitals, or the development of
urban renewal lands by church-relateduniversities. But for the
most part they have not made much of an impression.
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There are, it seems to me, two main principles to be discerned
in our actual practice concerning state support for church-connected projects. The first is that the forms of public support which
characterizedthe state establishments of the post-Colonial period
or which fueled the Protestant-Catholicconflicts of the nineteenth
century are generally to be avoided. This is why church-connected colleges fare better with the public purse than church-connected grade schools do. The principle has no logical basis; it
represents simply a desire to avoid what experience has shown to
be messy.
The other principle,more strictly ideological,is that the church's
work of religious worship and instruction cannot, as such, be
subsidized.72This principle makes its way into the law in a number of ways - the provisions, for example, that keep anti-poverty
money from being used for such purposes, or the provision that
funds made available for graduate study in the humanities are not
to be used for graduate theological study.73 This limitation meets
with general acceptance, even from those who think religion is
good for the state. When it comes to the realms of religious worship and instruction (the very realms, by the way, that we saw
could probably not constitutionally be taxed), we are ready to
agree with Rutledge that they are "the kingdom of the individual
and his God" or at least the kingdom of the individual and his
church.
There is, then, in the area of state support just what there is in
the other areas we have been considering. There is a main stream
of Erastian rhetoric and practice, representedin this case by the
public purpose argumentsof Bradfield, Cochran,and the Everson
majority, and by the reading of Rutledge's dissent that holds the
Voluntary Principle to be a constitutional tradition. And there is
a central core of High Church ideology that keeps the state out
of the church's central concerns, that guards the borders of the
kingdom of the individual and his God, that saves the means of
salvation from unhallowed perversion.
72The one serious exception is presented by military chaplains. On this, see
PFEFFER,
3

151,

217f.

United States Code, title 20, ? 1116.
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III
ERASTIAN FORMS

A. Social Service
The bread-and-butterChristianityof our people seems to accord
pretty much with the church-state doctrines of our courts. That
is, if we look hard enough,we can find latent in the witness of most
churches a High Church vision of a transcendent order standing
over against society. But their day-to-day understandingof what
they are about is characterized by an Erastian acceptance of a
place among the various institutions by which an overall and
traditionally Christian society underwrites the pursuit of happiness by its members. Even in the Sunday and holy-day realm of
religious worship, we are apt to think only secondarily about the
sovereign demands of God, to think primarily about the means of
grace or the sources of spiritual sustenance,74as if the pursuit of
happiness in the next world were all of a piece with the pursuit of
it in this.
The functions we attribute to our churches in this context are
not unlike those envisagedby Baird and Carrollin the last century,
or, indeed, those envisaged by the English commons in i306. In
the first place, we expect the churchto call down the divine blessing
on our public and private undertakings- much as the medieval
peasant expected the priest to bless his sick cattle or pray for a
bountiful harvest. So the minister,priest, or rabbi is appropriately
called in for the laying of a cornerstone, or to give that peculiar
combination of prayer and sermon called an "invocation" at a
banquet.
Next, as our medieval forefathersexpected the church "to teach
them and the people the laws of God," so we expect it to provide
suitable moral instruction to make good neighbors and good
citizens of us all. In conjunctionwith this endeavor, the churches
maintain a general educational enterprise parallel to that main"
Looking more or less at random for the sort of thing I have in mind, I turned
to the "Church Organizations" entry in the South Bend, Indiana, telephone book
on my desk. It has a quarter-page advertisement, compliments of the telephone
company, saying: "Go to the Church of your choice . . . Take someone with you,
you'll both be richer for it . .
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tained by the state and by private secular institutions. For the
most part, even those who oppose government financial support
for this enterprise recognizeits value to the community.
Then, "to make hospitalities, alms, and other works of charity"
is a function of the church today, just as it was in 1306. These
works involve a rich variety of economic, social, and civic concerns, just as they did in Baird's time. Probably they are shared
more today than formerly with governmental and secular organizations, but it is generally recognized that the church was first in
the field, and is still entitled to an honored place.
To bring home the complexity of these concerns, let me sketch
in briefly the situation in the community in which I live. There
are two main hospitals in town; one is run by an order of nuns;
the other by a nonprofitsecular corporation. The two main child
placement agencies are the Catholic Charities and the County
Welfare Department. Traditional down-and-out types are dealt
with by a traditional Protestant mission for the purpose. I would
not try to enumerate the agencies that deal with various aspects
of the race problem, but they include both the NAACP and the
Catholic Interracial Council. The latter (like the Presbyterian
Players, one of the two amateur theatrical groups in town) has
a broad nonsectarian membership, and seems under no kind of
control from the parent religious body. A numberof other church
projects seem to be in the same case. I know, for instance, of a
Boy Scout troop that transferred from the sponsorship of a public school to that of a Methodist church without any appreciable
change in personnel or program.
If I am beginning to sound like Baird, I have made my point
about the continuity of the tradition Baird represents.
There is one other element in church support of civic and social activities that is generally overlooked. That is the payment
of the salaries of the clergy. A good clergyman is apt to be concerned with a variety of civic projects, especially those involving
race and poverty. His participation differs from that of ordinary
Christian laymen in that it is generally regarded as part of his
job, and yet takes nothing out of the funds available for a given
project. The layman, unless he is paid, can be concerned with a
civic project only in his "spare time."
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Obtaining unpaid personnel for secular pursuits by expanding
the vocational role of the clergy is not a new expedient. Most
of the governmentalservices of the Middle Ages were staffed by
means of it. So were many of the educational services of a more
recent period. Not new either is the justification offered for such
an expanded clerical role: a pursuit where dedicated Christian
service is appropriateis a pursuit proper to be carried on through
a clerical staff. The ever-optimistic Pere Thomassin, writing in
the seventeenth century, gave a justification for the clerical bureaucratof the Middle Ages that could almost serve for the clerical NAACP leader of today:
**. an opportunityto exercisetheircharity,to sanctifythe court,
to makeof thekings'palacea sanctuaryof piety,to purifytaskswhich
are in themselvesprofane,to governthe worldaccordingto the laws
of heaven,to make the truthsand maximsof the Gospelprevailin
the conductof humanaffairs,finally,to makeof Christianmonarchies,
with the concurrence
of the monarchs,a kind of theocracy,or divine
government.75
The part about kings and courts would have to be brought up to
date, and there are some distinctions between the sacred and the
profane that are no longer in good repute; but the part about
making the truths and maxims of the Gospel prevail in the conduct of human affairs -

really the crux of the matter -

is as

persuasive as it ever was.
I do not mean to fault either the medieval or the modern cleric
for his acceptance of this rationale. For one reason or another,
it has never been found possible to organize the central works of
the ministry- preaching, catechizing, and conducting religious
worship- in such a way that all those engaged in these works
can keep themselves busy doing nothing else. Accordingly, the
clergy as a class have had to choose between working only parttime at their calling and accepting from the surroundingsociety
an expanded definition of the calling itself. The latter alternative
has generally seemed more in keeping with the dignity of the
ministry. And if the minister's calling must be redefinedto make
75Louis THOMASSIN, Ancienne et Nouvelle Discipline de l'Aglise, Andre ed.
(Bar-le Duc, Guerin, 1867), VII, 343 (my translation).
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a full-time job of it, the way we are redefining it in our society,
in terms of supporting causes that otherwise lack a sufficient
economic base, seems as good a way as any.
The other forms of civic involvement of the churches as I have
been describing them have also a good deal to be said in their
favor. If the projects in question were all conducted under governmental auspices, they would become disagreeably centralized,
probably with a considerableloss of grass-rootssupport for them.
And even if they were carried out by nonprofit secular corporations, the quality of our support for them would suffer. The participation of the churchesin civic projects gives a certain religious
sanction to all such projects, under whatever auspices they are
conducted; it reminds us that they can be carried out from religious motives. Erastianism, in short, is a two-way street. If it
carries a danger of secularizing the churches, it carries also a
hope of sanctifying the world.
B. Social Criticism
The approach of the main-stream churches to what Canon
Stokes calls "national issues" - issues, that is, involving the
moral order of society as well as the moral choices of individuals
--has characteristically involved two elements. First, there is
a judicious affirmationof relevant moral principles with due regard to the complexities of putting them into practice:
The Synod. .

.

. recommend it to all their people to use the most

prudentmeasures,consistentwith the interestand the state of civil
society, in the countieswhere they live, to procureeventuallythe
abolition of slavery in America. (Presbyterians, 1787) 76

Althoughhistory plainly testifies that the Churchhas always befriendedthe poor and laboringclasses,and effectuallyprocuredthe
mitigationof the evils attachedto serviture,until throughher mild
influenceit has passedaway fromthe nationsof Europe,yet she has
neverdisturbedestablishedorder,or endangeredthe peaceof society,
by followingtheoriesof philanthropy.(RomanCatholics,I858) 77
We, therefore,affectionatelyadmonishall our preachersand people
"

STOKES, II, I3 7.
77Id., 187-88.
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to keep themselves pure from this great evil [slavery], and to seek its
extirpation by all lawful and Christian means. (Methodists, i86o) 78
In the effort to establish a criterion or standard of measurement of
wages, it is necessary to consider not only the needs of the workingman, but also the state of the business or industry in which he labors.
(Roman Catholics, 1940) 79
Beverage alcohol is a serious social problem and cannot be ignored. It
is also a complex problem and cannot be solved at once. (Federal
Council of Churches, 1946) 80
Concomitantly, when specific courses of action or specific legislative goals consistent with the underlying principles appear to
be within the range of practical possibility, the spiritual prestige
and moral fervor of the church is apt to be directed to implementing them:
The undersigned, clergymen of different religious denominations in
New England, hereby, in the name of Almighty God, and in his presence, do solemnly protest against the passage of what is known as
the Nebraska Bill, or any repeal or modification of the existing legal
prohibitions of slavery in that part of our national domain which it is
proposed to organize into the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas.
(petition to Congress, 1854) 81
It is therefore urged that on some fixed day preceding the then pending Louisiana election, from the pulpits of the whole land an appeal
should be made to the Christian conscienceand purse. (an account of
the defeat of a state lottery in Louisiana, I894) 82
The forces of organized religion in America are now warrantedin declaring that this morally indefensible regime of the twelve-hour day
must come to an end. (joint statement of Federal Councilof Churches,
National Catholic Welfare Conference, and Central Conference of
American Rabbis, on the steel industry, 1923) 83
Be it Resolved, That the Executive Committee of the Federal Council
of Churches, realizing that lynching has become a national shame,
78Id., 167.
79Id., III, 91.
"
Id., II, 344.
81Id., 196.
82 Id., 298.
*
Id., 350.
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believes that national legislation is a moral necessity to bring the
Federal Governmentinto prompt and effective cooperationwith state
and local authoritiesin the prevention of lynching and the prosecution
of lynchers. (934) 84
We believe that there are certain measureswhich can be initiated now
or in the near future which can reduce some of the evil effects of
alcohol. .

.

. The following are, for the present, our operating prin-

ciples for social control:
i. Revision of the alcoholic beverage tax structure. ... .(seven
specific proposals all told - Federal Council of Churches, 1946) 85

I'd like to vote against it [the Civil Rights Act of 1964], but I can't.
The church groups are on my tail. (a Congressman)86
This stance of the churches on social problems has been criticized
from two directions. On the one hand, the promotion of specific,
and therefore contingent, political or social programs can be regarded as a diversion of the moral force of the Gospel. A Methodist critic of his church's part in the presidential campaign of
1928 puts it this way:
Preachers are accustomed to speak with dogmatism the truths of religion, and they should so speak, and when they make stump speeches,
they use the same dogmatism,although they are then in the field where
differencesof convictions exist between equally good men. There has
never been in the United States a political battle in which there were
not equally good men on opposite sides, but this fact, preachersturned
politicians, are almost sure to forget.87
Conversely, the concern of the church with politics can be faulted
for its inevitable recognition that politics is the art of the possible. Here is the judgment of the Abolitionist prophet Garrison
on the judicious efforts of churchmen to ameliorate the evils of
slavery:
Resolved: That (making all due allowance for exceptional cases) the
American Church continues to be the bulwark of slavery, and there84 Id.,

377.
SId., 343.
*LEE E. DIRKS, Religion in Action (Silver Spring, Md., National Observer,
1965), 147.
'
STOKES, II, 332.
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fore impurein heart,hypocriticalin profession,dishonestin practice,
brutal in spirit, merciless in purpose. ....

(1856)

88

Modern ecclesiastical temporizingin the areas of peace and civil
rights has evoked similar condemnations from time to time.
The willingness of the church thus to play the lobbyist or the
politician rather than the prophet seems to me to be part and
parcel of the Erastian tradition as I have been describingit - the
view that the churchis one of the many institutional forms through
which a Christian society conforms itself to the will of God. The
will of God may be in some cases unchanging and unambiguous,
but if it is to be approximated in a concrete situation, means
capable of affecting the concrete situation must be used. As long
as the church is considered part of the institutional structure of
society, it cannot be faulted either for departing from the realm of
generalities or for limiting itself to practical measures.
In fact, the two-prongedcritique of the church'sstance on social
problems rests on presuppositionsthat seem to me High Church.
Whether we propose an even-handed proclamation of ultimate
moral and religious values or an even-handeddenunciationof the
concrete situation, we are conceiving of the church as standing
over against society in general, the guardian of a revelation to
which society in general cannot be expected to conform.

IV
HIGH CHURCH FORMS

The High Churchview as I have been describingit provides the
state with a limit and the church with a critique. What it fails to
do is provide the whole church-state nexus with an institutional
High Church witness. This, in my opinion, has been a serious
defect in our national life. I have no wish to discount the value of
our Erastian tradition in giving practical content to a number of
Christian values. But the lack of High Church institutions to set
that tradition off has impoverished us in a number of ways.
Especially has it contributedto our tendency to an imbecile comSId., 19o.
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placency when things go well, and an equally imbecile despair
when things go wrong.
This necessity for a High Church element in the Christian experience of society derives, I suppose, from a deeper necessity inherent in Christianity itself. Much of a Christian's life in the
world must be worked out in terms of a dialectic between eternity
and time, between the Godheadand the manhood of Jesus Christ.
It is this dialectic that is reflected in the institutions of society
when those institutions present a vital dialectic between High
Church and Erastian forms. Only in this way can the overall
structure of society give adequate institutional expression to the
full range of the concerns of a Christian.
In this dialectic, I see High Church institutions 89as playing a
threefold part:
i. They stand witness to the transcendentsovereigntyof God.90
They are not utilitarian.They makeno claimto accomplishanything. They are simplythere,vindicatingGod'sclaim to a place
in the society that cannot be encompassedwithin any human
purpose.
but to
2. Theirresponseto socialevils is not to call for amelioration,
the
to
be
For
institution
the
of
God.
relevant,
proclaim judgment
the judgmentmust be related to the existentialfailings of the
particularsociety; yet, it mustpoint beyondthose failingsto the
underlyingfailureof all Christiansto live up to theirprofession,
"9I have decided, with some reluctance, to brave the conceptual perils of characterizing an institution, qua institution, as "High Church." High Churchmanship,
as I have defined it, is not an institutional form, but an insight into the overall
church-state relation - that is, into the relation of institutions generally with one
another. Historically, though, this insight has always cast up institutional forms
peculiar to itself - not, perhaps, by any logical necessity, but by the exigencies of
the dialectic in a given time and place. The medieval institutions of sanctuary and
clerical immunity are examples. When I speak of "High Church institutions" here,
I mean institutions that seem to take their raison d'etre from a High Church insight, or that seem calculated to hold up the High Church end of the dialectic.
' How an institution can stand witness to
anything is a question of some
subtlety. I have tried to explore it a little in A Prospectus for a Symbolist Jurisprudence, Natural Law Forum 2 (i957), 88. I suspect, incidentally, that it is this
symbolic aspect of High Churchmanship that supports its traditional connection
with a "high" doctrine of the sacraments and the liturgy. This connection is, I
think, one of congruity rather than of logical necessity. It is noteworthy that
English Presbyterians tended to take a High Church stand in the seventeenth century, and that a number of nineteenth-century High Churchmen based their liturgical practices on their interpretation of the rubrics established by ecclesiastical authority rather than on their sacramental theology.
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and of all society to be the Kingdomof God. John Jay Chapman's
remarkson a racial lynching (it is hard to believe that they were
written in 191II) may indicate what I have in mind:

The trouble has come down to us out of the past. The only
reason that slavery is wrong is that it is cruel and makes men
cruel and leaves them cruel. Someone may say that you and I
cannot repent because we did not do the act. But we are involved in it. We are still looking on. Do you not see that this
whole event is merely the last parable, the most vivid, the most
terrible illustration that ever was given by man or imagined by
a Jewish prophet, of the relation between good and evil in this
world, and of the relation of men to one another?
This whole matter has been an historic episode; but it is a
part, not only of our national history, but of the personal history
of each one of us. With the great disease (slavery) came the
climax (the war), and after the climax gradually began the
cure, and in the process of cure comes now the knowledge of
what the evil was. I say that our need is new life, and that books
and resolutionswill not save us, but only such disposition in our
hearts and souls as will enable the new life, love, force, hope,
virtue, which surroundus always, to enter into us.
This is the discovery that each man must make for himself the discovery that what he really stands in need of he cannot
get for himself, but must wait till God gives it to him. I have
felt the impulse to come here to-day to testify to this truth."9
A judgment so formulated might bring about a massive prise de
consciencein the overall society and so work an ameliorationof the
conditions to which the judgment was addressed. But the task of
the High Churchinstitutions is still the judgment itself.
3. They offer a refuge, I hope not from involvement in the world,
but from a kind of servitude to the world and its concerns. Within the frameworkof a suitable High Church structure, the Christian can assert his own freedom vis-a-vis society, and, in the light
of that freedom, formulatehis work and witness in the world.
Historically, the development of High Church institutions along
these lines has been in the context of an absolute papacy, a divine
" The Selected Writings of John Jay Chapman, Barzun ed. (Garden City,
Doubleday,

1959),

288.
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right monarchy,or at the very least a traditional national church.
In our own society, as I have endeavoredto show, the conceptions
of the Voluntary Principle, and of limited government, have left
a place for High Church institutions to develop, but the institutions have not developed to fill the place. The question is whether
we may expect them to do so in the future, as they have not done
in the past.
A book has just come out that may point the way to an answer.
It is a collection of essays, called The Underground Church,
edited by Malcolm Boyd.92 The authors are all involved with
Christian movements that operate outside the ecclesiastical structures with which we are familiar- hence the term "underground."
The relations between these movements and the traditional structures, which the authors call somewhat contemptuously the "institutional church," vary. Some are permissible- if unusualby traditional standards. Some are exuberantly uncanonical,
heterodox,or both. Some are even excommunicated. In any event,
they take their own structures (they are less unstructured than
most of them suppose) more seriously than those of the traditional denominationsto which they belong.
The typical structure is described by one of the authors as follows:
What I have seen as the characteristicform of the Underground
Churchis the gatheringtogetherof Catholics,Anglicans,Protestants,
and followersof Jesus (baptizedor unbaptized)in a commonmealbecauseit is the only way they havebeenable to findthe strengthof
communityfor the job that faced them tomorrow.Sometimesthat
commonmeal has taken the formof a traditionalliturgy,or an experimentalliturgy,or a completelyfreeliturgy,or a sharingof bread
and wine, or of coffeeand doughnuts;I am not able to make any
sharpdistinctionsamongtheseevenif I wishedto. Whenit has been
a liturgy,moreor less, therehas neverbeen any questionabout the
validityof any ministerpresent;it is taken for grantedthat if he is
authorizedin his own denominationand choosesto be present,he is
the representative
of Christ. As a matterof course,all the ministers
presentconcelebrate,althoughthis is irregularfor the Anglicansand
illegalin CanonLaw for the Romans.
92

New York, Sheed & Ward, 1968 (hereafter U.C.).
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We have had these commonmeals in parish houses, in private homes
in the suburbs, in the ghetto, in houses of hospitality, in jail, outside
San Quentin during an execution, on the Capital steps at Sacramento
while capital punishment was being debated, on the vigil line at Port
Chicago while the napalm trucks rolled by. Others can tell where
they have gathered together. Above all, there has been no question
of the meaning of what was done - the argumentover which so many
barrels of ink have been spilled during the Reformation, the Counterreformation, the Ecumenical movement, the Councils. Because the
meaning was defined in every man's heart to his own satisfaction by
the commonpurpose, the job in hand.93
The tendency, then, is to let the congregation define the Eucharist,9" whereas I suppose a traditional churchman would have it
that the Eucharist defines the congregation:
The visible church of Christ is a congregation of faithful men, in
which the pure Word of God is preached,and the Sacramentsbe duly
ministeredaccording to Christ's ordinancein all things that of necessity are requisite to the same.95
But the real quarrel of the authors with the institutional church is
not over Eucharistic theology. They object to the institutional
church because it is, as Malcolm Boyd puts it, "the chaplain of
the status quo" " -

i.e., is Erastian.

The Church, in losing ground as an institution which regulates behavior, now has little function outside of its place as an institution
among other institutions in the jumble of modern man's social collectivities.97
They are vitally concerned with those areas - notably, race, war,
poverty - in which the witness of the institutional church has
Toward a United Peace and Freedom Church, U.C. 31, 41-42. See
9 BROWN,
also ZIMMER,The People of the Underground Church, U.C. 7, 7-8.
9' GROSSMAN, The Invisible Christian, U.C. 207, 216: "The liturgy is not meant
to form the community, but, rather, to be an expression of that community."
the
9~This is Art. XIX of the Anglican Thirty-Nine Articles. Art. VII of
Lutheran Augsburg Confession is to the same effect. Standard Roman Catholic
doctrine would have to be stated a little differently to allow for the claims of the
hierarchy, but the idea that the liturgy forms the community, not the community
the liturgy, seems to underlie the insistence of the Second Vatican Council that
liturgical innovation is a prerogative of the highest authorities in the church.
BOYD, Ecclesia Christi, U.C. I, 4.
9 GROSSMAN, supra, note 94, at 209.
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not measuredup to the fulness of the Gospel. They are relatively
indifferent to areas -

notably, sex -

in which the witness of the

institutional church has been less deficient:
"TheChurch"will be seen less and less as a building,on a corner,to
be visited to confessmasturbationand adulteryand to indulgein a
period of "magic."98

This allocation of relative values - with which one could be a
Christian and yet disagree- has a good deal to do with the
urgency of their protest.
But we are still not at the roots of the quarrel. No serious
Christiancan suppose that race, poverty, and war are unimportant.
These matters deserve his attention and the attention of his
church. In fact, they are getting such attention. The problem is
that the attention they are getting is in terms of the traditional
Erastian response to social evils, as I have outlined that response
above. The underground churchmen pass on this response the
same condemnationGarrisonpassed on it a century ago:
The Churchis struggling,sacrificingevenits ownintegrity,to sustain
its organiclife recognizedin termsof buildings,stainedglass, real
estate,andhomileticalwhoredom.99
Thereare thoseChristianswho agreethat racismis a moralevil but
advocateprudencein removingit from society. They fear losing
peopleas Churchmembers;they fearlosingmoney. If preachingthe
of racism
messageof justiceand brotherhoodand the condemnation
means that half of our congregationsare going to stop comingto
churchon Sunday,we will lose millionsof dollars. But perhapsthe
Churchhas to die,perhapsit has to be crucified,in orderto experience
resurrection.100
Here, then, in the burgeoning cell groups described by these
Christi, U.C. 238, 245. Cf. GROPPI, The Church and Civil
98BOYD, Imitatio
Rights, U.C. 70, 75: "I do not believe that morality is synonymous with a negative
attitude toward sex and abstinence from what we call bad language." Cf. BROWN,
supra, note 93, at 43-44:
The one thing which is lacking so far is a definition of family life as a Christian.
To a large extent this is a reflection of the stresses of the Peace movement, which
favor the unmarried, those with casual liaisons, Catholic celibates, the divorced,
little old ladies in tennis shoes. Lest this be thought a criticism, it is simply intended as a translation of St. Paul's recommendations to the Church at Corinth.
ZIMMER, supra, note 93, at 14.
""
GROPPI, supra, note 98, at 74.
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essays, is a vital institutional Christian witness, and one which
stands clearly over against society. It condemns alike the "status
quo" orientation of secular society and the Erastian palliatives of
the institutional church. These groups are also a clear embodiment of the Voluntary Principle. The accounts of their grassroots developmentare curiously reminiscentof Baird's account of
the building of churches in frontier communities.'01
I think these groups are coming also to a High Church stance
on the social evils with which they are concerned. While they
speak in terms of reformand amelioration,their real significanceis
in their proclamationof the judgment of God. For the problems
they face, they have no better solutions to offer than anyone else
does. But their unblinking exposition of the problems makes the
proposed solutions seem futile, and their moral fervor makes the
proposed solutions seem trivial.
One of the contributors to the volume, for instance, is Father
James Groppi,the Savonarolaof Milwaukee, who spent the better
part of a year in a bitter and sometimes bloody battle to put an
open housing ordinancethroughhis city council.
Duringthe earlydays of our open-housingdemonstrations
they were
almost
have
all
killed. We
been in jail; we have all eaten
literally
teargas.102
But anyone who is familiar with the operation of open-housing
legislation in other communitieswill find it difficultto believe that
that is what all the excitement was about."1"It is good to have
such legislationon the books, but it will hardly avail to appease the
supra, note i, at 298-99.
Supra, note 98, at 74.

101BAIRD,
102

103 My own community, for instance, has just enacted an open-housing ordinance.
The first serious attempt to put such an ordinance through was mounted in 1963.
Those who prepared the 1963 ordinance assembled a considerable amount of data
on the need for it. The main thrust of the data was that middle-class Negroes were
finding it outrageously difficult to get middle-class housing. By 1968, this situation
was considerably ameliorated, though by no means done away with. On the whole,
in 1968, a middle-class Negro could put a suitable roof over his head, though not
always the roof he wanted. The ordinance may do something to widen the range
of available choices for him. If it had been enacted in 1963, it might have also had
some value as an earnest of good will on the part of the white majority. In 1968,
it seems too little and too late to serve that purpose. As for increasing the range of
housing choices available to Negroes who have not yet made the middle class, the
problem in 1968 is just what it was in 1963 - they cannot get better housing because they have not the wherewithal to pay for it.
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divine anger of a man like Groppi; still less to dissipate the conditions that called that anger forth. The Underground Church is
not calling on us to erase a transitory blemish from our national
life, but rather to live that life in a new and enduring (and, please
God, redemptive) awareness of the divine judgment.104
Meanwhile, the Underground Church institutions have developed strongly the element of refuge that I see as another High
Church function. Here is Father Groppi, immediately after the
passage quoted above:
As the demonstrationsprogressed, as we were marching and singing
together, we were growing in our relationship as brothers. White
people and Black people were growing. In true intergroup relations,
a person never ceases to grow. And the more we grow in brotherhood,
the more we grow in the Spirit, for brotherhoodand life in the Spirit,
like the spiritual and temporal orders, are inseparable.105
That is, the Milwaukee Youth Council is for Father Groppi a
refuge from the prevailing racism of the overall society, just as
the monastery was for the medieval man a refuge from the prevailing petty warfare and violent sexuality of the overall society.
This theme is picked up by the Underground Churchmen again
and again:
More than anyplace else, I too now find the Church of the Christ I
have long loved in the "small groups of intimate friends getting together. . o ." It is here I find not only expression of, but care for,

the most powerful ideas and ideals that I have known. .... Bearing
the humiliation with the few as the majority rationalizes its way
toward more inaction: these are the truths of real life in Christ
today.

...o10o

The "good news" about the freedom of the sons of God becomes perceptible and significantwhen its liberatingmessage is specifiedas .
the possibility of escape from the cycle of violence enthralling teenagers.0o7
"' BROWN, supra, note 93, at 46, seems to be working toward an understanding of
this: "But if we try and enter down into the secret places of our psychology or
think about our knowledge of history, we truly know that the pressures that brought
us together are permanent ones."
105 GROPPI, supra, note 98, at 74.
'" ZIMMER, supra, note 93, at 26.
1o GRODENand CLASBY, Church as Counter-sign:

Process and Promise, U.C. 102,

113-14.
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The mostobviousand immediateasset one experiencesin an UndergroundChurchis a truesenseof belonging.Unlikethe averageparish
in whichneitherthe priest nor the other parishionersare likely to
Churchall the members
knowone another'sname,in an Underground
soon knowone anotheron a first-namebasis, and, what is moreimportant,are willingto share their thoughtsand souls with one another.108
We are tryingto walk in the freedomof Abraham'sfaith, out of the
oppressionof our closedand too clubbylittle worldand into open
air and openhistory,into the middleof ultimaterealities.1'9
War, alienation, anonymity, gang fights: the evils are variously
specified, but the sense of belonging to a small group free of the
evil in question is there each time. It is one of the most powerful
elements in the witness of the UndergroundChurch.
Proclaiming God's judgment, then, on our social evils, and
offeringa point of refuge and freedom from them, the institutional
forms of the UndergroundChurchare authentically High Church.
But they fall short of institutionalizing the fulness of the High
Church witness, because they fail to stand for the transcendent
sovereignty of God. It is not simply that they neglect to offer this
witness; they counter it actively at two focal points. First, by
claiming for the here-and-nowcongregation and worshipper full
control over the significance of the Eucharist, they negate the
transcendenceof God in space and time. Second, by discounting
traditionalsexual values, they negate the transcendenceof God in
the life of the individual.
The relation of traditional Eucharistic doctrine and traditional
sexual purity to the divine transcendencelies in the very fact that
they are not of obvious relevance to the immediate situation. To
accept them is to accept that God has something to offer to the
"'
and to me as a human being
church as a historical presence,1"0
beyond the needs I experience here and now. Living by them is
HAFNER, Up from the Underground, U.C. 120, 131.
KIRK, Emmaus: A Venture in Community and Communication, U.C. 138, 151.
this regard that BROWN, the one professional theologian
11o It is significant in
1os

109

seems to regard the church as gathered not by the word
among the authors in
U.C.,
of the historical situation. See the passage quoted
of God but by the exigencies
supra, note 104.
... On
this, see the critique of situation ethics in BURTCHAELL, The Conservatism
of Situation Ethics, New Blackfriars 48 (1966), 7.
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essentially living by faith; it yields only gradually an insight into
what they are for."2
"My thoughts are not your thoughts nor your ways my ways,
says the Lord." My fear is that these UndergroundChurch institutions, by cutting themselves off from the channels of transcendence, will deprive themselves of any insights beyond those they
now possess. If so, they will fall with the passage of time, as other
High Church institutions have done, from proclaiming the judgment of God into mounting a captious and irrelevant critique,
from offering a position of freedom and refuge into offering an
enclave of human comfort. If, on the other hand, they could in
some way relate the divine transcendence to the forms in which
they now operate, they might provide our society with an enduring
High Churchwitness to set off against our Erastian tradition, and
structure a truly Christian society.
V
CONCLUSION

Let me now gather these threads together, if I can, and try to
outline the institutions of the American church-state nexus as it
just might come to be.
First, there would be a variety of institutions conceived, as they
have always been, in Erastian terms. These, some governmental,
some ecclesiastical, some private and secular, would operate
schools, hospitals, cooperatives, credit unions, recreational activities, and other forms of practical social service that commend
themselves to Christians. Their support would come partly from
specific contributions,partly from United Funds, foundationsand
the like, and partly from tax money, in accordancewith the need
and importance of each particular institution.
The participation of churches and of individual Christians in
these institutions would be directed by a continuing High Church
critique of the whole society. Christianswould respond to the divine judgment embodied in that critique by applying their wis112
This idea of faith as an open-ended acceptance of enlightenment is well
brought out in JOHN S. DUNNE, A Search for God in Time and Memory (New
York, Macmillan, 1969).
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dom and resources to the real needs of their society - not in the
expectation of justifying themselves or the society, but in the
humble expectation of redemptionthroughJesus Christ.
This kind of humble expectation would involve a Christian
patience under the condemnationsof the proponents of the High
Church critique. Demonstrations, which seem to serve contemporary High Churchmenrather as excommunicationserved Innocent III, are neither practical proposals nor arguments. If a situation is complex, they will not make it less so; they will simply
serve to make explicit the judgment of God. Those who are concernedwith findingand implementingpractical measureswill have
to take them seriously, but not panic under them.
Meanwhile, the High Church institutions would temper their
strictures by a heightened awareness of the enduring realities of
the human condition and the theology of redemption. Not that
they would compromisetheir witness against the evils of society,
but that they would maintaina certain respect even for those they
condemned, rememberingthat in the last analysis the judgment
they proclaim is not upon certain bad people, but upon all mankind, including themselves.
The form and development of these High Church institutions
would be rather like that of the UndergroundChurch movements
I have been describing. Most of them would be spontaneous
responses to particular social situations, and would come and go
with the social conditions that called them forth. They would
continue to offer a witness against and a liberation from the racist
patterns that infect our society, the cycle of poverty in which so
many of our people are involved, warfare and other forms of
violence, and the dehumanizingeffect of an overly efficient mass
polity.
They would also offer a witness against and a liberation from
the mechanisticand unlovely sexuality that permeates so much of
our popular culture, and seems as dehumanizingand as displeasing to God as any of our other social evils. Perhaps they would
come to this witness and liberation through a reconciliationwith
some of the more traditional church institutions- youth groups,
Cana Conferences,and the like - that have long carried the burden of Christian witness with respect to sex. In any event, they
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would be free of the identification of sexual purity with white
middle-class respectability that currently distorts every aspect of
Christian witness in our society.
These grass-roots institutions would abandon their claim to
define the meaning of the Eucharist for themselves. They would
recognize that as they do not possess the fulness of the divine
revelation, the meaning of the Eucharist cannot be circumscribed
by their understandingof it. At the same time, the main-stream
churches would accept the adoption by these groups of liturgical
forms suited to their own needs, but consistent with traditional
views of Eucharistic theology. This acceptance would be furthered by the realization on everyone's part that participation in
groups of this kind is a special vocation rather than the wave of
the future for every Christian. The reconciliation of the mendicant orders with ecclesiastical authority in the Middle Ages might
be a pattern for reconciliationsof this kind today.
In this context, central authorities in the church would accept
the Voluntary Principle, just as do central authorities in the state.
They would expect people to set up groups for particularreligious
purposes, just as they do for particular secular purposes. They
would supervise these groups, but not expect them to obtain advance approval.1'"
The primary function, then, of the institutional church would
be to stand witness to what is timeless and universal in the Gospel
and the sacraments, especially the Eucharist. Like the state, it
would overarch both High Church and Erastian forms, supporting a variety of work and witness, according to the exigencies of
time and place. It would claim for itself in unequivocal terms
the position of transcendenceleft open by the self-imposed limits
on the power of the state, the position of universality left open by
particular High Church forms, the position of necessity left open
by contingent Erastian forms.
I seem to be speaking here as a Roman Catholic, and perhaps
in the end a High Churchman after all. I am aware that the
13"For instance in my own church, some modification of Codex Juris Canonici
Canons 684-99 would seem in order, e.g., can. 686, ? I: "No association will be
recognized in the Church that has not been set up or at least approved by legitimate
ecclesiastical authority."
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Voluntary Principle is Protestant in origin, and that Protestants
have lived with it more easily than Catholics. I am aware also that
not every denominationof Christiansis prepared,as my own is, to
make the transcendent claims I have just envisaged. Some denominationswould no doubt be content to see themselves as manifestations of the Voluntary Principle ("gathered"churches), and
leave the claims to transcendence to Christ Himself. Certainly
each denominationwould have to consult its ecclesiological doctrine to see what claims of this kind it could make for itself, and
its ecumenical doctrine to see what such claims it could recognize
for others.
The upshot is that the American church-state nexus I envisage
would not be free from denominational divergences. The facile
ecumenism of the UndergroundChurch is part and parcel of its
failure to bear a sufficient witness to the transcendence of God.
True ecumenism requires every denomination to bear an uncompromisingwitness before the others to its own experience of
the inexhaustible reality of Jesus Christ. Perhaps the witness to
institutional transcendenceas I have described it will be a contribution of my own denominationto the synthesis that God may one
day bring about.
Be that as it may, the church-state nexus I have envisaged is
not one free from conflict, or one with all the problemsworked out.
It has built-in potentialities for tension, frustration,or even heartbreak, as any human situation has."' It might be a situation,
though, in which the Word of God could break forth in its own
way, or at least a situation in which a Christian could live by his
own best understandingof the Gospel, and do such work and bear
such witness as God has called him to. This is perhaps all we can
hope for from institutional patterns in this world. As Chapman
says:
This is the discovery that each man must make for himself - the
discovery that what he really stands in need of he cannot get for
himself, but must wait till God gives it to him. I have felt the impulse to come here today to testify to this truth.
notion of "creative tension," supra, note 98, at 83.
"1I like Father GROPPI'S
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